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Case No. 20080785-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
BRANDON MICHAEL GIBBONS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West Supp. 2008).l This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err by not making a relevance and accuracy 
determination on the record regarding alleged inaccuracies in the pre-sentence 
investigation report. 
Unless otherwise indicated, citation to any statute is to the current 
version, or West Supp. 2008-2009. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-l(6)(a) is reviewed for correctness. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^ 13, 6 P.3d 
1133. 
2. Did the trial court plainly err by not making a sentencing statement 
before imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term for aggravated 
kidnapping? 
Standard of Review. Because this issue is raised for the first time on appeal 
it is reviewed for plain error. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, f 19,192 P.3d 867. 
3. Did the trial court plainly err by not ruling that the presumptive 
fifteen-years-to-life term violates the state and federal constitutions? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is the same as that set forth 
above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of the following statutes are attached in addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, one count of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, 
and one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. Rl-3. 
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Plea Agreement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to 
one count of aggravated kidnapping. R59-66. The other charges were 
dismissed, and the State agreed to not file a second aggravated robbery case 
against defendant. Id.; see also R67-68. 
Sentence. Defendant was sentenced to the presumptive statutory term of 
"not less than 15 years and which may be for life." R80-81; R90:ll; see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(4). 
Notice of Appeal. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R86-87. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
While brandishing a broken glass bottle, defendant approached victim, 
Alana Heaps, in a grocery store parking lot. R2. Defendant held the broken 
bottle to Heaps' stomach and looked through her wallet. Id.; PSI-2 at 2, 4. He 
found a bankcard to America First Credit Union. PSI-2 at 4. Defendant forced 
Heaps back into her car while he got into the back seat and held a black metal 
2
 Because defendant pled guilty and the preliminary hearing was waived, 
the fact statement is taken from the Information (Rl-3), the Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (R59-66), and the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation. The Pre-Sentence Investigation consists of two reports, neither of 
which is numbered in the record. The first report, dated 28 April 2008, is titled 
'Tost Sentence Report" and will be referred to as "PSI-1." It was prepared for 
another conviction, but after the commission of the current offense. The second 
report, dated 14 August 2008, is titled "Presentence Addendum Report" and 
will be referred to as "PSI-2." It was prepared before sentencing for the current 
offense and supplements PSI-1. 
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object, which she thought was a gun, to the back of her neck. R2; PSI-2 at 2. 
Defendant forced Heaps to drive him from the grocery store parking lot in Salt 
Lake City to an address he gave her for an America First Credit Union ATM in 
Sandy. Id.; PSI-2 at 2,4. Once at the ATM, defendant forced Heaps to withdraw 
forty dollars and then drive him away. R2. Defendant mentioned having Heaps 
drive him to meet a friend, but he instead got out of her car a short time later. 
Id.; PSI-2 at 2, 5. Heaps immediately reported the crime and defendant was 
arrested at the 9000 South Trax Station by a Sandy Police Officer. R. 3. After the 
kidnapping, Heaps found cuts and scratches on her stomach where defendant 
stuck her with the broken bottle. Id. These injuries were photographed at the 
police station. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court erred in not resolving alleged inaccuracies in 
the PSI on the record. However, because the trial court's error did not affect 
the sentencing recommendation or the trial court's imposition of the 
presumptive statutory term, defendant's sentence should not be vacated. 
The case should be remanded solely to allow the trial court to resolve the 
alleged inaccuracies on the record. 
Point II. Defendant did not challenge the trial court's failure to give a 
sentencing statement upon imposing the presumptive statutory term of 
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fifteen years to life. He has thus forfeited this claim on appeal. This Court 
may not address this claim under either rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, or the plain error doctrine. Rule 22(e) does not excuse 
defendant's failure to preserve his claim because the trial court had proper 
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, and because the presumptive term was 
within the range authorized by the aggravated kidnapping statute. The plain 
error doctrine does not excuse defendant's failure to preserve this issue 
because defendant has not shown, and cannot show, that any possible error 
should have been obvious to the trial court. No controlling statute or case 
authority requires the trial court to make a sentencing statement before 
imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. Because there is no 
settled law requiring a sentencing statement in this circumstance, defendant 
fails to show any error, let alone obvious error. Defendant's plain error claim 
must therefore be rejected. 
Ft• iilit I! L Defendant did not challenge the state or federal 
constitutionality of the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term in the trial 
court; therefore, this claim is also forfeited on appeal. The plain error 
doctrine does not excuse defendant's forfeiture because, as before, he has not 
shown, and cannot show, that the term's alleged unconstitutionality should 
have been obvious to the trial court. There is no controlling statute or settled 
case law stating that a f if teen-years-to-life term for an aggravated kidnapping 
that does not involve serious physical injury or death is unconstitutional. 
Defendant's plain error claim must therefore be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT MAKING A RELEVANCE 
AND ACCURACY DETERMINATION ON THE RECORD 
REGARDING ALLEGED INACCURACIES IN THE PRE-
SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
In Point I of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to correct 
two alleged inaccuracies in PSI-2 on the record. Appellant's Br. at 9-12. In Point 
II of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court consequently relied on 
irrelevant and inaccurate information and his sentence should therefore be 
overturned. Appellant's Br. at 12-18. Although the State concedes that it was 
error for the judge not to make an accuracy and relevancy finding on the record, 
the error did not affect the sentencing recommendation, or the trial court's 
imposition of the presumptive statutory term. Therefore, this case should be 
remanded for an appropriate accuracy and relevancy finding on the record, but 
defendant's sentence should not be vacated. At most, defendant is entitled to 
have the trial court re-evaluate his sentence, once it has resolved the alleged 
inaccuracies on the record. 
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A. Proceedings Below. 
Pre-sentence Im estigation. The following evidence was adduced from 
the pre-sentence investigation. Defendant scored as a "High risk" offender, 
meaning he had a high likelihood of re-offending. PSI-2 at 2. Areas of concern 
included defendant's "criminal history, employment status and history, 
financial situation, leisure time, companions, substance abuse history, and his 
mental health history/' Id. Defendant had several prior convictions, including 
two class A misdemeanors and three class B misdemeanors. See PSI-1 at 3. 
Defendant also had several arrests, including three third-degree felonies and 
multiple misdemeanors and infractions. See id. 
Although several family members and family friends wrote to the trial 
court on defendant's behalf, no family member was willing to allow defendant 
to live with them. PSI-2 at 5; see R. 71-78. Defendant had no monthly income 
and was fired from the only job he has ever had because he tested positive for 
drugs while on probation. PSI-1 at 4-5. Defendant also has a recurring drug 
problem that has "increased in severity over time and the defendant has stated 
his drug problem has led to law violations, family problems, employment 
problems, financial problems and medical problems all within the past year." 
Id. at 5-6. 
As a result of an unrelated conviction for attempted illegal drug 
possession, defendant has previously completed an in-jail drug rehabilitation 
program called CATS. Id. at 4. After completing the in-jail portion, defendant 
was released on probation, during which he attended a CATS aftercare program 
and held a job. Id. However, while still on probation, defendant tested positive 
for heroin. Id. Adult Probation & Parole was contacted and a warrant was 
issued for defendant's arrest in November 2007, but defendant absconded from 
AP&P custody. Id. Defendant was not apprehended until February 22, 2008, 
when he was arrested on the instant kidnapping charge. Id. Defendant's former 
employer said that defendant is as smart as a "rocket scientist/' but that 
"defendant uses his intelligence to try and beat the system any way he can." 
PSI-1 at 6. 
The PSI-2 used a sentencing matrix to calculate a sentencing 
recommendation for defendant in this case. The sentencing matrix assigns 
points for various factors. The points fall into a point range. This point range is 
paired with the category of crime committed. Using a chart to map the point 
range and crime category, a sentencing recommendation is reached. See PSI-2 at 
Form 1. 
Defendant scored eleven points on his sentencing matrix. PSI-2 at Form 1, 
*1. However, this inaccurately included two points for a prior felony conviction, 
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which defendant did not have. See PSI-1 at 3; R. 90:3. Defendant's score, 
therefore, should have been nine. However, either score —nine or eleven — 
places defendant into the sentencing matrix point range of eight to eleven. See 
PSI-2 at Form 1, *2. 
A score of eight to eleven falls into row III of the sentencing matrix. PSI-2 
at Form 1, *2. Defendant's admitted crime, a first-degree felony against a 
person, falls into crime category C. See Id. Using the chart in the Sentencing 
Matrix, a row III, category C offense has a suggested prison term of eight years. 
See id. 
Sentencing Hearing. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel brought 
two alleged inaccuracies in PSI-2 to the trial court's attention. R90:3-4. Defense 
counsel first noted the error explained above, that the sentencing matrix 
incorrectly added points for a prior felony conviction, resulting in a score of two 
for that category and a total score of eleven. R90:33; see PSI-2 at Form 1, *1. 
Defense counsel asserted that this was inaccurate and handed to the judge a 
copy of PSI-1, which correctly accounted for defendant's criminal history. R90:3; 
see PSI-1 at 3. Defense counsel explained, "[a]s you can see from the attached 
pre-sentence report out of Judge Roth's court, [defendant] has no prior felony 
3
 A copy of the sentencing transcript is included in addendum A. 
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convictions and, therefore, he scores a zero in that category. . . . and his total 
score [should have been] nine." Id. 
Turning to the second alleged inaccuracy, defense counsel directed the 
trial court's attention to victim Alana Heaps' statement in PSI-2. R90:4. Defense 
counsel alleged that Heaps' statement was inaccurate because she suggested 
defendant was "somehow . . . proud about this misdemeanor case out of Judge 
Roth's court." R90:4. Heaps' actual statement was that "[Defendant] prided 
himself on the fact that he had pled a felony down to a misdemeanor." PSI-2 at 
4. Defense counsel did not challenge the accuracy of the PSI's relation of Heaps' 
statement, only her interpretation of defendant's statements. R90:4. Defense 
counsel alleged that defendant was not proud about pleading down a felony to 
a misdemeanor, but that he was proud of completing the CATS program and 
beginning CATS aftercare: "[T]hat's the only concept that [defendant] was 
trying to convey to [the pre-sentence investigator] which, unfortunately, in his 
communications with the named victim somehow got misconstrued." Id. 
Having brought the alleged inaccuracies to the trial court's attention, defense 
counsel stated, "Your Honor, with those two corrections in place . . .," and 
continued on to another topic. R90:4. 
Thereafter, Heaps addressed the trial court, making a victim impact 
statement ("VIS"). See R90:9-10. Heaps stated that she was "a little bit bothered 
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by the idea of just having a six to life term after what [she had gone] through 
that day/ ' R90:9. Heaps explained how defendant's misconduct had affected 
her, stating that she "honestly didn't think that [she] was going to live after 
[they] picked up his friend. . . . It was a horrible day." R90:9-10. She further 
noted that she works at the Federal Courthouse where she has "to talk to people 
every day in the front lobby," and that she has trouble "doing [that] now." 
R90:9. Heaps continued, 
I have a really hard time thinking that there was three charges, 
pleading to one. The reason he pled to that one is because I didn't 
agree — I said we'll go to trial if he doesn't plead to that one. That's 
the main thing that happened I care that I had to sit and look at 
the clock and think that I'm supposed to pick my babies up from 
daycare in an hour and I'm not ever going to see them again. So I 
think 15 to life is not asking a whole lot. And I think within that 15 
years, or however long, he can get all the treatment that he needs. 
And he can maybe sit there and think what it's like to wonder if 
you're going to die in the next five minutes or not. 
When Heaps finished, the judge asked defense counsel, "anything else?" 
Id. Defense counsel made no objections to Heaps' statement, but did assert that, 
" [defendant's] intent was not to harm in any way, shape or form." Id. The court 
responded, "Well, she didn't know that." R90:ll. Defense counsel replied, "I 
know. But the reality is he didn't threaten to take a life." Id. The court trial 
pointed out," [t]hat's not the dea l . . . [i]t's what was in her mind, not his mind. . 
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. . I don't think he needed to say I'm going to kill you. It was the way she was 
receiving what he was doing. . . . I'm glad she came in because it makes a big 
difference to me." Id. 
The trial court imposed the presumptive statutory term of fifteen years to 
life. Id.; R80-81. 
B. The trial court's failure to make a relevancy and accuracy 
determination on the record was error. 
The trial court is required to resolve inaccuracies in a PSI: "Any alleged 
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been 
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought 
to the attention of the sentencing judge, and . . . the court sliall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(6)(a) (emphasis added). As the statute states, once alleged inaccuracies in the 
PSI have been brought to the sentencing judge's attention, the judge has a duty 
to "make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record." Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court explained the sentencing judge's duty in State v. Jaeger: 
"the sentencing judge [must] consider the party's objections to the report, make 
findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is accurate, and 
determine on the record whether that information is relevant to the issue of 
sentencing." 1999 UT 1, Tf 44, 973 P.2d 404. "It is insufficient to make general 
statements 'concerning the court's view of the defendant and the case/" State v. 
Kohl 2000 UT 35, | 33, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44). 
As noted, defense counsel raised two alleged inaccuracies in the PSI-2: 
first, that the sentencing matrix incorrectly added two points for a prior felony 
conviction when defendant did not have any prior felony conviction; and 
second, that Heaps' statement incorrectly described defendant as being proud of 
pleading down a felony to a misdemeanor. R9Q:3-4. The trial court did not 
make a finding on the record regarding either of the alleged inaccuracies. See id. 
Therefore, the sentencing judge failed to comply with the requirements of the 
statute. As will be discussed below, however, the error did not affect the 
sentencing recommendation and the sentence should not therefore be vacated. 
Rather, the case should be remanded for a relevance and accuracy determination 
on the record. See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f^ 44-45 (where alleged inaccuracies in PSI 
do not affect sentence, "proper remedy is to remand [the] case to the trial court 
with instructions that it expressly resolve [the] objections in full compliance with 
section 77-18-l(6)(a)"). 
C. The trial court's failure to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report did not affect defendant's 
sentence. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions in Point II of his brief, the trial court's 
failure to resolve alleged inaccuracies in PSI-2 on the record did not affect the 
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imposition of the presumptive statutory term. Indeed, whether or not the 
alleged inaccuracies are true, there is no evidence that the trial court relied on 
either alleged inaccuracy in imposing sentence here. 
1. Trial courts are given wide latitude in sentencing. 
The alleged inaccuracies raised by defendant can be "described as 
ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' errors regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." See State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 
9, f^ 15, 84 P.3d 854. Tlierefore, a trial court is given "wide latitude in 
sentencing" and a sentence will be vacated only if there has been an abuse of the 
judge's discretion. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 66, 52 P.3d 1210. A trial court 
abuses its discretion when "it fails to consider all legally relevant factors," such 
as mitigating and aggravating circumstances, or if the sentence exceeds 
statutory limits. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990), quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 
1133,1135 (Utah 1989)). As will be shown, the record reflects that the trial court 
considered all legally relevant factors, and that the sentence does not exceed 
statutory limits. 
Here, the trial court was made aware of the alleged discrepancies between 
PSI-1 and PSI-2. See R90:3-4. Defense counsel argued that PSI-2 inaccurately 
gave defendant points for a prior felony conviction that did not exist. R90:3. He 
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also argued that Heaps' statement in PSI-2 inaccurately described defendant as 
being proud of pleading a felony down to a misdemeanor. R90:4. After 
bringing the alleged inaccuracies to the trial court's attention, defense counsel 
effectively acknowledged their informal resolution by stating, "Your Honor, 
with those two corrections in place . . .," and then continuing on to another 
topic. Id. If defense counsel was truly worried that the trial court had not 
understood the inaccuracies or had not accepted his arguments, his statements 
at the hearing failed to reflect such. Id. The record does not therefore support 
defendant's claim on appeal, that the trial court relied on the alleged inaccurate 
information in imposing sentence. Cf. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 11 (noting defendant 
has burden to show trial court failed to consider proper factors in imposing 
consecutive sentence). 
Moreover, the record supports that the trial court properly considered 
legally relevant factors before imposing the presumptive statutory term. PSI-1 
and PSI-2, including Heaps' victim impact statement, were replete with 
aggravating circumstances, e.g., defendant's history of drug abuse, criminality, 
and lack of employment and family involvement. See PSI-2 at 2-5. Further, the 
pre-sentence investigator specifically concluded that" [defendant] presented] a 
serious threat of violent behavior," and that "defendant's actions posed a 
serious threat to public safety." PSI-2 at Form 4, *1. 
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On the other hand, PSI-2 did not specifically enumerate any mitigating 
circumstances. PSI-2 at Form 4, *2. While defendant had letters of support, no 
family member was willing allow him to live with them. PSI-2 at 5. In fact, 
when defendant had no place to go in the middle of winter, his family forced 
him to live in a tent instead of allowing him to sleep in their home. R73. 
Nevertheless, defense counsel asserted several mitigating circumstances at the 
sentencing hearing, including family and community support letters (however 
equivocal that support), defendant's alleged remorse and guilty plea, and his 
good behavior before abusing drugs. R90:4-7. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's consideration of these proper factors 
and arguments, defendant speculates that the trial court improperly relied upon 
the alleged inaccuracies or irrelevant information in sentencing him. See 
Appellant's Br. at 12-18. However, even if it were reasonable to assume that the 
trial court considered the allegedly inaccurate and irrelevant information, as 
defendant contends, it is just as reasonable to assume that the trial court 
considered the above relevant information. Those legally relevant factors 
support the sentence imposed, even if the trial court might have also considered 
the alleged irrelevant information. The record thus fails to reflect any abuse of 
the trial court's broad sentencing discretion. 
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2. Defendant's sentence is not inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive. 
But even assuming that the trial court did rely on the alleged inaccurate 
information, defendant's sentence is within the limits set by law. An 
indeterminate term of fifteen years to life is the presumptive statutory sentence 
for aggravated kidnapping. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(a). The statute 
provides for deviation from the presumptive sentence only in particular 
circumstances. In its discretion, a trial court may adjust the sentence up to life 
without parole if there are specific aggravating factors, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-302(3) (b), (c), or down to a term of either ten-years-to-life or six-years-to-life if 
it is in the interests of justice, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(4) (a), (b). 
Considering the balance of aggravating to mitigating circumstances here, 
it was not an abuse of the judge's discretion to apply the presumptive fifteen-
year term. Indeed, a trial court should only deviate from the presumptive 
aggravated kidnapping sentence if it is in the interests of justice. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-302(4). As shown, "the judge was sufficiently apprised of the 
pertinent background facts concerning the defendant to impose sentence/7 State 
v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1067,1068 (Utah 1989). Moreover, defendant fell in the same 
point range of eight to eleven regardless of whether he scored a nine or an 
eleven on his sentencing matrix. See PSI-2 at Form 1, *2. Either way, the 
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recommended term would have been eight years. See id. Therefore, imposing 
the requested six-years-to-life term requested by defendant would have been 
contrary to the sentencing recommendation, and would have also ignored the 
significant factors of defendant's threat to public safety, history of drug abuse 
and addiction, escalating criminality, inability to maintain employment, and 
token familial support. Therefore, deviating from the presumptive term would, 
on this record, be a disservice to the interests of justice. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-302(4). Defendant's sentence is fair and proportionate to the crime, and 
should therefore be upheld. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT 
MAKING A SENTENCING STATEMENT BEFORE IMPOSING 
THE PRESUMPTIVE FIFTEEN-YEARS-TO-LIFE TERM FOR 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING. 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by not 
giving a sentencing statement detailing the reasons for imposing the 
presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. Appellant's Br. at 18-29. Alternatively, 
defendant asserts that if his claim is unpreserved, the trial court's alleged error 
in failing to give a sentencing statement should be addressed under 1) rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or 2) the plain error doctrine. Appellant's Br. 
at 3-4. Defendant's claim should be rejected because it is unpreserved, and 
because his failure to preserve is not excused by rule 22(e) or plain error. 
-18-
A, Defendant failed to preserve a specific challenge to the trial 
court's failure to give a sentencing statement. 
An appellate court will not consider claims raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 33,122 P.3d 543; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
If 11,10 P.3d 346; State v. Tillman, 750 R2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). Here, defendant 
did not preserve a challenge to the lack of a sentencing statement and, therefore, 
forfeited any appellate review. State v. Snyder, 74:7 P.2d 417,421 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant's assertion of error for the first time on appeal is inconsistent 
with Utah's contemporary preservation rule. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 
947 (Utah 1982) (//TThis is clearly a case where a timely and specific objection 
would have afforded the trial court the opportunity to address [the defendant]'s 
concerns/'). Utah courts require timely and specific objections "in order 'to 
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an 
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
361 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11 (" [T]he 
trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if 
appropriate, correct i t") (quotation and citation omitted). "Accordingly, an 
objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial 
[court] can consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, If 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). 
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Here, defendant asked the trial court to impose a sentence of six-years-to-
life, and alleged some minimal mitigating circumstances. See R. 90:4-8. When 
the trial court imposed the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term, defendant 
raised no objection, let alone an objection that the trial court had failed to make a 
sentencing statement. See R90:ll. Defendant never asserted that the trial court 
had failed to consider the mitigating circumstances presented during the 
sentencing hearing. See id. 
Defendant's request that the trial court consider mitigating circumstances 
and impose a lesser sentence of six-years-to-life was insufficient to alert the trial 
court to the defendant's claim on appeal, that it was required to make a 
sentencing statement on the record before imposing the presumptive term. 
Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected. 
B. Neither rule 22(e), nor the plain error doctrine excuse 
defendant's failure to preserve his claim. 
As for defendant's alternative reliance on rule 22(e), and the plain error 
doctrine, they do not apply here. 
1. Defendant's reliance on rule 22(e) is misplaced. 
"The purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal 
sentences" at any time. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5, 48 P.3d 228. It is not 
intended to be an exception to general rules of preservation. Consequently, 
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claims under rule 22(e) "must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse." Id. 
To fit within a "narrowly circumscribed" illegal sentence claim, the sentence 
must be "patently," State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), or 
"manifestly," Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5 n.l , illegal. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 
15. "A 'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally occurs in one of two 
situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the 
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 
f^ 15 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, jf 5 n.l). Neither of these situations exists here: 
the sentencing court had proper jurisdiction and the sentence was within the 
range authorized by statute. Indeed the sentence is the presumptive term for 
aggravated kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(a). 
2. Defendant has not shown, and cannot show, plain error. 
For relief under the plain error doctrine, defendant must show that "(i) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for [defendant]." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 
(Utah 1993). If any one of these prongs is unmet, the others need not be 
addressed. Cf State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993). 
Here, defendant's claim of plain error fails under the first two prongs. He 
cannot show that the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, because the 
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aggravated kidnapping statute does not require a trial court to explain its 
imposition of the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-302(3). Rather, the aggravated kidnapping statute requires a trial court to 
make a sentencing statement only if it "finds that a lesser term than [the 
presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term] is in the interests of justice/7 Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-302(4).4 Then, and only then, must the trial court "state[ ] the 
reasons for this finding on the record[.]" Id. The aggravated kidnapping statute 
does not, therefore, require the trial court to make a sentencing statement before 
imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302(3). 
Moreover, defendant cites no Utah case authority, and the State is aware 
of none, which requires the trial court to make a sentencing statement before 
imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term under the aggravated 
kidnapping statute. See Appellant's Br. at 18-29. "Utah courts have repeatedly 
held that a trial court's [alleged] error is not plain where there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 
App. 1997). Accordingly, defendant has not and cannot show that it should 
4
 The aggravated kidnapping statute also authorizes a term of life without 
parole where there are specific aggravating factors not present here. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3)(b)-(c). 
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have been obvious to the trial court that it was required to make a sentencing 
statement before imposing the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term. 
Defendant's plain error claim must therefore be rejected. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208; Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT RULING 
THAT THE PRESUMPTIVE FIFTEEN-YEARS-TO-LIFE TERM 
VIOLATES THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant asserts that the aggravated kidnapping 
sentencing scheme violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, and its state counterpart in article I, section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 29-30. Specifically, defendant asserts that 
imposition of the presumptive fifteen-years-to-life term was unconstitutional 
because the aggravated kidnapping here, "while admittedly quite serious did 
not involve death or physical injury/' Apellant's Br. at 30. Acknowledging that 
this issue is unpreserved, defendant asks the Court to review it under the plain 
error doctrine. Appellant's Br. at 4. 
Here, defendant's plain error claim fails as a matter of law because he 
cannot show obvious error. No possible error in imposing the presumptive 
fifteen-years-to-life term could have been obvious to the trial court because there 
is no settled appellate law stating that a fifteen-years-to-life term for an 
aggravated kidnapping that does not involve serious physical injury or death is 
unconstitutional. Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Defendant cites no such authority, and 
the State is aware of none. Indeed, defendant's claim of cruel and unusual 
punishment, on these facts, borders on the frivolous. See, e.g., Euring v. California, 
538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003) (citation omitted) (rejecting Eighth Amendment 
challenge to Ewing's "three strikes sentence of 25 years to life" for "offense of 
'shoplifting three golf clubs'"); United States v. Angelas, 433 F.3d 738,750-53 (10th 
Cir.) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 55 year prison sentence 
mandated for Angelos's conviction on three separate offenses of possession of a 
firearm in connection with a drug offense), cert, denied, 549 U.S. 1077 (2006). 
Defendant's plain error claim must therefore be rejected. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208; Germonto, 868 P.2d at 61; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239.5 
5
 Notably, defendant, who is represented by the same firm that 
represented him below, does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel in 
conjunction with any of his claims of plain error. Because an error that should 
have been obvious to the trial court, should have also been obvious to defense 
counsel, claims of plain error are typically raised together with claims of 
ineffectiveness. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906-07 (Utah App. 1994), 
vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court, but remand the case for the 
limited purpose of resolving the accuracy and relevancy of challenged 
information in the PSI. 
Respectfully submitted _ L April 2009. 
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PROCEEDINGS 
* • * 
THE COURT: Your Honor, this is Brandon Gibbons. 
Mike Peterson representing him. 
THE COURT: Did I get appearances? 
MS. COLLINS: Chou Chou Collins for the State. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, do you have the 
pre-sentence report in this case? 
THE COURT: I do. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, I need to correct two 
matters. First, on form one in the report, the addendum at the 
end, the score that the AP&P agent has indicated of 11 is 
incorrect because they list a score of two for prior felony 
convictions. As you can see from the attached pre-sentence 
report out of Judge Roth's court, Mr. Gibbons has no prior 
felony convictions and, therefore, he scores a zero in that 
category. 
THE COURT: Unfortunately, I didn't get an 
attachment. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, if I may approach? It's 
just the brief class A misdemeanor report out of Judge Roth's 
court. It's plain from that attachment that Mr. Gibbons has no 
prior felony record and, therefore, has a zero in that category 
and his total score is nine. 
3 
The other thing I needed to correct was a 
misperception that occurred when the pre-sentence report 
writer, Nathan Eldridge, was communicating with the named 
victim in this case. On page four, the second paragraph from 
the bottom, there was some indication that Mr. Gibbons had 
somehow been proud about this misdemeanor case out of Judge 
RothTs court. What I want to clarify there is this, your 
Honor, he wasn' t proud about pleadincr a third decrree down to a 
class A. In fact, that was just a standard offer for a 
possession case. What he expressed to the agent was that he 
took some measure of satisfaction and pride in the fact that he 
completed the CATS program and then was beginning the CATS 
after care. And that's the only concept that he was trying to 
convey to Nathan Eldridge which, unfortunately, in his 
communications with the named victim somehow got misconstrued 
about being proud that he got a class A off of a third, or 
something along those lines. 
Your Honor, with those two corrections in place as 
you know from the outset when we entered this plea we come 
before you, number one, on a mandatory prison case. The issue 
for the Court today is six to life, ten to life, or 15 to life. 
We're asking the Court to please look at the option of a six to 
life commitment here, because this is a first felony offense 
for Mr. Gibbons, albeit very serious. But also because, Judge, 
as you can see from the pre-sentence report that you have, and 
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the one from Judge RothTs court, and from the outpouring of 
family and community support letters that you received in this 
case, Mr. Gibbons obviously has a long standing, problematic, 
troubling history with substance abuse. 
And he thought that he had gotten that somewhat well 
in check going through the Judge Roth case, getting the CATS 
program done, the after care. But, unfortunately, there was an 
obvious relapse. Mr. Gibbons freely acknowledges in his 
statement to the Court in this report that he had been using 
for a significant period, even while on Judge Roth's class A 
probation, that he had become dope sick, that he had called 
home to try and get some money. That didn't work out. 
And that in this sort of dope sick desperation he 
found a broken bottle in a parking lot area and held it up to 
this named victim. I want to reiterate something I said at the 
time of the change of plea, Judge, and that is that Mr. Gibbons 
in no way, shape, or form minimizes how serious this conduct 
is, and how tremendously traumatic this was to Alana Heaps, and 
the kind of psychological difficulty he has caused her. He 
realizes this is going to take significant counseling and other 
forms of assistance in her life. 
He wants the Court to know, the State and Ms. Heaps 
to know how awful he feels about that conduct. His intention, 
Judge, was basically to get her between the bottle and the car 
and see if he could get $40 or $50 from her wallet. That was 
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the idea, but what ended up happening was he ordered her into 
the car. Realizing there was no cash in the wallet, he then 
ordered her to drive out to an ATM. 
He admits he looked through the wallet, Judge, found 
an ATM card, realized what branch it was to and said, okay, 
this is where we're driving to. AP&P suggests in one sentence 
in this report that Mr. Gibbons really truly didn't take 
responsibility or proper remorse for this case, but I beg to 
differ significantly. Because when he entered his plea, he 
plead to a mandatory imprisonment case. He plead to a case he 
knew could carry 15 to life. He did not force this case into a 
trial when some other clients in other states of denial may 
have. He took a very tough plea bargain. Ms. Collins will be 
the first to admit that he took a tough plea deal here, 
subjecting himself to a long stretch in prison. 
But what he did not do ever, was ever deny the 
essential facts of what he did to Ms. Heaps. At least from the 
time that I was his lawyer onwards. He may have said something 
initially to a detective that wasn't straightforward, but from 
the day he and I were engaged in this case through the court 
system he has fully acknowledged what he has done. He has 
always said let's plea bargain this for the best offer that we 
can get, and that's what we did. So, Judge, I think on balance 
when you look at the family and friends' support letters, and 
I've probably given you a migraine, I just kept sending them to 
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you every other day as they came in. They talk about Brandon 
Gibbons who grew up in a safe, structured middle class 
environment where he excelled in his church activities, where 
he excelled in his scouting activities. And then, 
unfortunately, around 16 or so he fell in with a different 
group and he started using. And a couple of the wheels have 
flown off since then and he's battled this addition for some 
period of time. 
But fundamentally what these letters talk about is a 
very caring and kind, compassionate human being who, when he is 
not under the influence or drug seeking, doesn't do anything 
remotely like this. He does not have crimes of violence in his 
past. So I'm asking the Court to put Mr. Gibbons in a position 
with the Board of Pardons with a six to life where they have 
all the options available to them, depending on what he does to 
prove himself inside the system. 
If you look at his matrix, Judge, he scores at an 
eight year time frame for parole eligibility. There's no 
question — 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this though, wasn't he on 
parole at the time? 
MR. PETERSON: He was not. He was on probation to 
Judge Roth on a class A after completing CATS inpatient — 
THE COURT: So he wasn't a fugitive. Well, it says 
he was a fugitive. 
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MR. PETERSON: He had absconded from his AP&P 
probation, but it was on a class A misdemeanor. The reason 
you're looking at him right now, your Honor, in a prison suit 
is because when he went to the order to show cause with Judge 
Roth, he told the judge I will do my year in the prison. The 
reason he told Judge Roth that, over Ms. Stamfs objection, was 
that he knew this case was coming. And he knew he was going to 
prison on this case, so he got out there to start his 
treatment. And the good news is, Judge, he is now in a wing of 
the prison where he's doing just that. He's engaging in active 
treatment for his issues. 
But back to my point. With the matrix suggesting an 
eight year date prior to parole consideration, I'm asking the 
Court to impose the sentence in the six to life time frame 
rather than the ten to life or 15 to life so then the Board 
does have the maximum leverage and they don't feel like they're 
handcuffed by this Court's sentence being ten to life or 15 to 
life. And if he were to prove himself the way I think that he 
can in the kinds of programming, the Conquest drug program, 
etcetera. I appreciate Ms. Heaps will be appearing at his 
parole hearings and will be speaking about the traumatic nature 
of this event. And fine, that's appropriate and sobeit. But 
at least then the Board has all of its ability to act and react 
according to Ms. Heaps' input and to Mr. Gibbons track record. 
THE COURT: Ms. Collins. 
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MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, the victim is here and she 
wishes to speak to the Court. 
THE COURT: Okay. Will you have her come up? 
MS. COLLINS: Yes. Your Honor, this is Elaine Heaps. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MS. HEAPS: I'm a little bit bothered by the idea of 
just having a six to life term after what I went through that 
day. I mean, I have to sit and think about what if my babies 
would have been in the back seat and I hadnf t been at work that 
day? Or when I was sitting on 90th South staring straight 
across from a cop, and having him tell me to drive careful so 
that we didnf t get picked up. And I was trying to figure a way 
to wreck the car so at least my body would get found that day, 
because I honestly didn't think that I was going to live after 
we picked up his friend, or whatever we were going to do. 
And if it was all about just needing treatment, and 
just wanting treatment or whatever, he could have asked me to 
stop. He had a thing from Odessey House on the front seat of 
the car. And I had hid everything else from my work there 
because I thought that was going to make it worse. But he 
could have asked me to take him to treatment. He wouldn' t have 
got picked up. 
He could have asked to go to the hospital. They 
offered him to go to the hospital. He said, they don't have 
what I need. So I don't think that — it doesn't feel like to 
9 
me at all if it was about needing help and wanting help. It 
was a horrible day. And I work at the Federal Courthouse. I 
have to talk to people every day in the front lobby, and I have 
issues doing it now. Smells make me almost sick. Things are 
just crazy. 
I have a really hard time thinking that there was 
three charges, pleading to one. The reason he plead to that 
one is because I didn't agree -- I said we'll go to trial if he 
doesn't plead to that one. That's the main thing that 
happened. I don't care about what he took from my ATM. I don't 
care whatever else. 
I care that I had to sit and look at the clock and 
think that I'm supposed to pick my babies up from daycare in an 
hour and I'm not ever going to see them again. So I think 15 
to life is not asking a whole lot. And I think within that 15 
years, or however long, he can get all the treatment that he 
needs. And he can maybe sit there and think what it's like to 
wonder if you're going die in the next five minutes or not. 
THE COURT: Is that it? Okay, thank you. 
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, with what the victim just 
said we will submit. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Peterson, anything else? 
MR. PETERSON: Judge, just that Mr. Gibbons intent 
here was to get $40 or $50 to go get dope. His intent was not 
to harm in any way, shape or form. 
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THE COURT: Well, she didn't know that. 
MR. PETERSON: I know. But the reality is he didn't 
threaten to take a life. 
THE COURT: That's not the deal, Mr. Peterson. It's 
what was in her mind, not his mind. 
MR. PETERSON: I understand. But I am suggesting 
what was conveyed during that ride was not a risk of death. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think he needed to say I'm 
going to kill you. It was the way she was receiving what he 
was doing. 
MR. PETERSON: There's no doubt, Judge. I'm not 
trying to minimize that at all. 
THE COURT: And I'm glad she came in because it makes 
a big difference to me. I'm going to sentence him to an 
indeterminate term of 15 years to life and take him forthwith. 
(Whereupon the record was closed at 9:50 a.m.) 
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Addendum B 
Ul SI § 77-18-1 Fage 1 ol I 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
r
 J Chapter 18. The Judgment 
*^§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision-
-Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and condit ions-
Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in abeyance 
agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in 
Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or offense, 
the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C 
misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with the 
department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as 
ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all 
individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall be 
provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and 
the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by 
the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the supervision 
and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards 
based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and submit it to 
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the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the probation 
of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence 
investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may 
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of 
obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or information from other sources 
about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement according to 
guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the 
victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, 
accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with 
interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under Section 77_-
18-1.1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report 
ordered by the court under Section.76-3-404/ are protected and are not available except by court 
order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, 
or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three 
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, 
which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought 
to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to 
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of 
sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-302 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
KbJ Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos) 
"bl Part 3. Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Smuggling 
^ § 76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of committing unlawful 
detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third person 
to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping" means in 
the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years and which may be 
for life; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that 
during the course of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the aggravated 
kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense. 
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that a lesser term than 
the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for 
this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than: 
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or 
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b): 
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(i) ten years and which may be for life; or 
(ii) six years and which may be for life. 
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person Is sentenced under Subsection (3) 
(c). 
(6) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
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